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ments present in operational negligence and unseaworthiness situations.5 6 In addition, it appears that the courts have completely
disregarded the position of the shipowner. As stated in the dissent
in Skibinski, the courts are using shipowners as a conduit for imposing the liability on the stevedore companies, which are regularly
impleaded. 57 However, where the stevedore company is judgment
proof, the innocent shipowner must suffer the judgment without
any effective recovery over.
An aim of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is to limit the liability of the longshoreman's employer.
Section 905 provides that the employer's liability under the act is
exclusive and in place of all other liability."" It is possible that
the courts are motivated by a belief that the compensation, which
ranges downward from a maximum of two-thirds of the employee's
average weekly wage for total disability, is inadequate ;59 however,
the remedy provided by statute is clear and it is beyond the scope
of the courts' functions to attempt to circumvent this legislation.
It appears that it is time for a legislative review of this entire area,
emphasizing the interrelationships between the unseaworthiness
doctrine and the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Without such
legislative action the Supreme Court should examine the ill-defined
distinctions of the unseaworthiness doctrine in the same context.
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DEsPITE LAcK OF "PROBABLE CAUSE" REQUIREAppellant was apprehended in an apartment house by a
tenant, an off-duty policeman, who had observed appellant and his
companion tiptoeing around the hallway. Upon receiving an unsatisfactory answer as to their presence in the hallway, the officer
"frisked" the appellant for a weapon. He felt something hard
"which could have been a knife," and withdrew from appellant's
pocket an opaque plastic envelope which, upon examination, was
found to contain burglar's tools. This evidence was used to secure
an indictment against appellant for unlawful possession of burglar's
tools. Appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the evidence as
constitutionally inadmissible was denied and he was convicted upon
AMENDMENT
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The court carefully indicated that no determination had been made as
to the
validity of the distinction.
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Supra note 37, at 544.

This is provided so that the employer secures payment for his injured

employees. Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat.
1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
59 Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1427
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908(a) (1964).
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a plea of guilty. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
1
frisk, pursuant to the New York "Stop and Frisk" law, was not
a constitutionally prohibited search and that the evidence disclosed
thereby was admissible. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219
N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
In Mapp v. Ohio,2 the United States Supreme Court, for the
first time, made the federal rule excluding evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure applicable to the states. The
Court held that the admission of such evidence was a violation of
the fourth amendment 3 as made applicable to the states by virtue
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court, however, did not attempt to set down any specific guidelines
by which the state courts were to decide whether a search and
seizure was reasonable.4 In Ker v. California,5 the Court openly
stated that Mlapp had not laid down any "fixed formula," 6 and that
the states are not precluded from developing workable rules of their
own. 7 It was also pointed out, however, that the states will be
expected to adhere to the "'fundamental criteria' laid down by the
Fourth Amendment . . ." and that state courts' "findings of reason-

ableness . . . are respected only insofar as consistent with federal
The Court has scrutinized, and will
constitutional guarantees."
continue to scrutinize, any attempts by the states to set their own
standards of reasonableness under the fourth amendment.
Traditionally, the primary constitutional prerequisite for a reasonable search and seizure has been "probable cause." The term
seizure as used in the fourth amendment applies both to the seizure
of property and of persons, i.e., an arrest. 9 Probable cause for an
I N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180-a.
2367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV states: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
4 The lack of specific criteria in Mapp led to discussion as to whether
the states were free to develop their own standards of reasonableness, or
whether they must adhere to federal requirements. See Commonwealth v.
Richards, 198 Pa. Super. 39, 182 A.2d 291 (1962). See also People v. Tyler,
193 Cal. App. 2d 728, 734, 14 Cal. Rptr. 610, 613 (Dist Ct. App. 1961),
where it is stated that "we find nothing in Mapp v. Ohio . . . to indicate
that . . . the states are bound to follow the federal requirements of reasonableness and probable cause instead of their own."
5374 U.S. 23 (1962).
6 Id. at 31-32.
7Id. at 34.
s Id. at 33. It should be noted that Harlan, J., dissenting, interpreted
the majority decision in Ker as indicating that "state searches and seizures
are to be judged by the same constitutional standards as apply in the federal
system." Id. at 45 (dissenting opinion).
9 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959) ; Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949).
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arrest has been said to exist where the facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a man of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed.1 0 There must be something more than common rumor,
suspicion, or even a showing of a strong reason to suspect.1 The
United States Supreme Court has adopted the constitutional test of
"probable cause" for determining the reasonableness of an arrest or
search on the ground; that it is the best compromise between the
individual's right to privacy and efficient law enforcement. "Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow
less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' whim or caprice." 12
New York's "Stop and Frisk" law does not adopt the traditional standard of "probable cause" as its test of reasonableness.
Under it, a police officer is authorized to stop, question, demand
identification and an explanation of any person in a public place
whom he "reasonably suspects" has committed, is commiting, or is
about to commit a felony or serious misdemeanor.' 3 If, in the
course of inquiry, the officer "reasonably suspects" that he is in
danger of life or limb, he may frisk the suspect for dangerous
weapons. If the officer discovers a dangerous weapon or anything
else, the possession of which constitutes a crime, he must make

an arrest.14 The basic question raised by such a statute is whether
its standards and procedures meet the requirement of reasonableness dictated by the fourth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically answered the question. Nevertheless, there are indications both from
it and the lower federal courts that police may rightfully stop and
question, even where there is no "probable cause" to make an
arrest.15 Several states, either by statute 6 or judicial decision, 7
have endorsed this practice.
10Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1962); Brinegar v. United States,
supra note 9.

11 Henry v. United States, supra note 9, at 101; Brinegar v. United States,
supra note 9, at 175.
"Brinegar v. United States, supra note 9, at 176. (Emphasis added.)
"3N.Y. CoDE CRim. PRoc. § 180-a(1).
14 N.Y. CODE Cims. PRoc. § 180-a(2).
25 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960) ; United States v. Vita,
294 F2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961), cerl. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962); United

States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on, other
grounds sub norn. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
16 See DEL. CoDE AN. tit. 11, §§ 1901-03 (1953) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 594, §§ 1-3 (1955); RI. Gmx. LAWs tit. 12, ch. 7, §§ 1-2 (1956). See
generally Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
17People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Hennennman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347

Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964).
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Prior to the enactment of the "Stop and Frisk" law, it was
not clear whether or not an officer in New York could detain a
suspect for questioning without an arrest warrant, or without "probable cause" to make an arrest.', The grounds for arrest were
clearly delineated by statute, 9 but there was no statutory provision
for the "stop." In 1964, after the enactment of the "Stop and
Frisk" law but prior to its effective date, the New York Court of
Appeals, in People v. Rivera, 20 declared that the right to detain
without arresting was a valid, "indispensable" exercise of police
power. It was held that a "stop" is clearly distinguishable from an
arrest. The "stop" was characterized as an "immediate and sumwhich need not be justified by a showing of
mary street inquiry"
"probable cause." 21 Although the Court did not explicitly so state,
its determination was undoubtedly made22 with the future application
of the "Stop and Frisk" law in mind.
It has become a firmly entrenched urban police practice to frisk
a suspect prior to arrest under circumstances in which the officer feels
that his life may be in danger.2" Over the years, there has been
an increasing clamor for the official sanctioning of what is seen
by many as an invaluable precaution against deadly assaults on
police officers. 24 Heretofore, only two types of warrantless searches
have been deemed constitutionally permissible-searches which were
incidental to a lawful arrest,25 and those which were made with

consent.26 These standards have been jealously guarded by the
is
Supreme Court, which has shown concern where any 2 attempt
7
made to circumvent the fourth amendment's prohibitions.
Proponents of the frisk have sought to distinguish it from the
search, for which the standard of reasonableness is clearly "prob'Is
Legislation, 38 ST. JoHn's L. REv. 392, 399 (1964).

New York defines

an arrest as "the taking of a person into custody that he may be held to
answer for a crime." N.Y. CODE CRIm. PRoc. § 167.
'19Legislation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 392, 399 (1964).
20 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964),
cert. denied,
3792 U.S. 978 (1965).
1Id. at 444-45, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
22 Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464. It should be remem-

bered that any discussion of the "frisk" presupposes the legality of the "stop,"
which must be deemed reasonable before any right to "frisk" may arise.

23 See examples cited in Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law
of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1203-06 (1952).
24Kuh, New York's New "Stop and Frisk" Law, 151 N.Y.L.J., May 29,
1964, p. 4, cols. 1-5; Warner, Tie Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315,

325 (1942).
25 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959).
26 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
27 See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); United States v.

Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932), where it was said that "an arrest may
not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."
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able cause. '28 A frisk has been defined as a running of the hands
over another's person or pockets, as distinguished from a search,
which is a stripping "to examine the contents more particularly." 29
Those states which have adopted the Uniform Arrest Act have
sanctioned a frisk for a weapon by a police officer who reasonably
believes that he is in danger. 30 In California, it has been held that
a police officer, in order to insure his safety, may frisk a suspect
he is questioning. 31 In People v. Rivera,32 the New York Court of
Appeals held that a police officer may frisk a suspect as an incident
to a lawful stop if he reasonably suspects that he is in danger. In
Rivera, a loaded pistol had been found on the suspect's person.
The defendant contended that such a search and seizure without
"probable cause" for an arrest was illegal and the evidence thereby
obtained was inadmissible. After deciding that the stop by the
officer was a reasonable procedure, the Court stated that "we are
required to recognize hazards involved in this kind of police duty
. . . [and] we think the frisk is a reasonable and a constitutionally
permissible precaution to minimize that danger. '33 The frisk "may
be justified as an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental
34
safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search.
Although recognizing that "probable cause" is required to justify a
search, the Court viewed the frisk as not nearly as great an invasion
of privacy. The Court found that the frisk did not violate constitutional notions of reasonableness and that the arrest based on the
"probable cause" acquired by the frisk was valid. The Court concluded that since the weapon had been legally seized, it was therefore admissible evidence. Since the purpose of the frisk in Rivera
was to find a weapon which might prove dangerous to the officer
stopping and frisking, and the weapon found was the item sought
.to be admitted into evidence, the Court had no occasion to discuss
an arrest where the frisk results in a discovery that the person
stopped had no weapon but instead had an object the possession of
which constitutes a crime.
28

See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961).
Business Men's Ass'n v. McLaughlin, 126 Misc. 698, 701, 214

29 Kalwin

N.Y. Supp. 99, 102-03 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 216 App. Div. 6,

2143 N.Y. Supp. 507 (2d Dep't 1926).
0UmFoRm ARRnsr AcT § 3. Note that the act speaks only of a

"search" for a dangerous weapon, and ms no confiscatory provision comparable to that found in New York's "Stop and Frisk" law.
31 People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956); People v. Jones,
176 Cal. App. 2d 265, 1 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Dist. Ct App. 1959); Gisske v.
Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (Dist. Ct. App. 1908).
32 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964).
See also
People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936 (1965).
33 Id. at 446, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
34 Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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The instant case arose subsequent to the effective date of New
York's "Stop and Frisk" statute. The evidence seized as a result
of the "stop and frisk" was not a dangerous weapon but instead
was a set of burglar's tools. In upholding the validity of the stop,
the Court stated that where the circumstances are reasonably suspicious, the ability of the police to make inquiry is indispensable to
effective crime prevention. 35 The Court noted that the power to
make such a limited intrusion has long been recognized. 6 Since
"the statute makes it clear that the Legislature did not intend the
stopping and frisking to be an arrest,"37 it was reasoned that this
kind of limited intrusion can reasonably be made on less than
"probable cause." The standard of "reasonable suspicion" set by
the statute was seen by the Court to be as equally capable of objective meaning as is "probable cause," thus providing a useful working standard for testing the legality of the stop.38 The frisk was
distinguished from a full search and was held to be a reasonable
and constitutionally permissible precaution to minimize the danger
to a police officer. The fact that the frisk produced a set of
burglar's tools rather than a dangerous weapon was held not to be
controlling. Since the officer, upon frisking the defendant, reasonably believed that he felt a knife, he had a right to remove the
object from the defendant's pocket. Upon discovery that it was
a packet of burglar's tools the officer had probable cause for an
arrest and the right to seize the evidence.3 9 Therefore, since the
evidence was properly seized it was held to be legally admissible.
Judge Fuld, dissenting, reasoned that merely calling a search
a "frisk" for a dangerous weapon cannot justify evading the "probable cause" requirement.40 No search can be made without sufficient grounds to make a lawful arrest, i.e., "probable cause." In
his opinion, the "probable cause" to arrest in the instant case had
been obtained unconstitutionally, and, therefore, the evidence revealed by the frisk should have been suppressed.
Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissenting opinion, which was stated
in People v. Sibron,41 a companion case, was willing to concede the
theoretical reasonableness of the statute, but doubted that it could
be reasonably applied in practice. In Sibron, a police officer, after
watching the appellant engage in conversations with known narcotics
35 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 242, 219 N.E.2d 595, 597, 273 N.Y.S.2d
217, 220 (1966).
361d. at 244, 219 N.E.2d at 598, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
37Ibid.
usId. at 244, 219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
3
9 Id.at 245, 219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
"Old. at 248, 219 N.E.2d at 601, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 225 (dissenting opinion).
41 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966)
(memorandum
decision).
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addicts, approached the appellant in a restaurant and asked him
to step outside. The policeman stated: "you know what I am
looking for." Thereupon, the appellant reached into his pocket,
and the policeman put his hand into the appellant's pocket intercepting appellant's hand, and found narcotics packets therein in a
metal tinfoil wrapper. A motion to suppress the evidence was
denied in the lower court and affirmed on appeal in a memorandum
decision..4 2 Judge Fuld dissented and voted to reverse for the
reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in People v. Peters. Judge
Van Voorhis, in dissent, focused his attack on that portion of the
statute which permits police officers to retain as evidence "contraband" other than a weapon seized pursuant to a frisk. He reasoned that since "the power to frisk is practically unlimited, inasmuch as [it] . . . depends to a large extent upon the subjective
operations of the mind of the officer," 43 it is inherently subject to
abuse. However, the fact that a procedure is subject to abuse, does
not preclude the possibility that it might still be reasonable. The
frisk, he continued, is a reasonable exception to the "probable cause"
rule, but only insofar as it can be justified as a precautionary
measure rather than as a search. Apparently, to insure that the
frisk remains a precautionary measure, Judge Van Voorhis believes
that the officer should not be tempted to proceed with his frisk
once he is satisfied that the suspect is not armed. Thus, if an
officer knows that any evidence seized pursuant to his frisk will be
admissible in court, he will be tempted to overstep the constitutional
restrictions inherent in "stop and frisk," and make a general search
of the person. In concluding, Judge Van Voorhis stated that the
statute was unreasonable in that it placed a premium on abuse of
the power to frisk, and undermined the public policy announced in
Mapp v. Ohio.
The instant case and its companion, Sibron, mark an extension
of the stop and frisk rule as announced in Rivera. In Rivera,
the removal of the weapon from the suspect's pocket was justified
on the ground that the officer had "probable cause" to make an
arrest when he felt the hard object in the course of the frisk. The
intrusion into the pocket was not part of the frisk based on reasonable suspicion, but was a search based on "probable cause" for
arrest. In the Peters case, however, the Court considered the
invasion of the suspect's clothing as an integral part of the frisk
based on reasonable suspicion, and not as a search justified by
"probable cause." The "probable cause" for arrest did not arise
42 People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.Zd 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374
.(1966)
(memorandum decision).
4
3Id.at 605, 219 N.E.2d at 197, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
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until the officer had removed the hard object from the suspect's
person and examined it more closely. Although the Court adhered
to the definition of a frisk as the patting of the exterior of the
clothing, it nevertheless countenanced the further invasion on less
than "probable cause." The decision in the Sibron case also indicates that the Court viewed the frisk as something more than a
mere patting of the outer garments. In that case, the officer put
his hand into the suspect's pocket without first having felt for the
presence of weapons. The prosecution admitted that at the time
of the intrusion the officer did not have probable cause for arrest.
Thus, the silence of the Court implies that such an intrusion is
part of the frisk and thus justified on mere reasonable suspicion.
Therefore, the statute, as construed, permits an extensive frisk
of the suspect's interior clothing and the seizure of any articles
unlawfully possessed. The conduct authorized by the statute appears to be only loosely circumscribed. According to Sibron, a
preliminary "patting" is not necessary. A policeman acting under
reasonable suspicion may immediately withdraw the contents of the
suspect's pockets. According to Peters, the policeman may thereafter closely examine the contents of anything revealed, to the point
of opening sealed packages in the search for a weapon. Although
the statute authorizes a frisk as a precautionary measure, the Court
in Peters condoned the further intrusion into the suspect's effects
after the danger has been eliminated by "disarming" the suspect.
Apparently, there is no requirement of a continuing suspicion of
personal danger to justify the continuing intrusion. As long as the
officer is able to satisfy the court that his conduct was initially
motivated by a reasonable suspicion of personal danger, the evidence
will be admitted.
By holding admissible all evidence seized during a "frisk" on
"reasonable suspicion," the Court in the instant case has contributed
to the realization of the worst fears of the opponents of the "Stop
and Frisk" law. The very concept of "stop and frisk" presupposes
that there is, in each case, a line between a frisk and a search. But
the Court, as clearly evidenced in Sibron and Peters,has allowed that
line to be crossed without "probable cause," and has left the door
ajar for abuse. By going beyond the purpose of the frisk, i.e., to
insure the officer's safety, we may well be providing a pretext for
making a general search of the person without "probable cause,"
because knowledge that all evidence found during a "stop and frisk"
will most likely be admissible might prove an incentive to frisk all
"suspicious looking" persons in the hope that something unlawful
will be discovered. Even the strict upholding of the standard of
"reasonable suspicion" suggested by the majority in Peters is not
precaution enough against the dangers of "dragnet" procedures.
In order to safeguard our fourth amendment guarantees the pro-
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phylactic as well as the curative measures of the judicial process
are needed.
There is good reason for the constitutional requirement of
"probable cause" for search and seizure by law enforcement officials.
"Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow
less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officer's whim or caprice." 44

This thought must be kept in mind

in any attempt to balance our society's interest in law enforcement
against its constitutional guaranty of privacy. It is submitted that
the reasonableness of the frisk on "reasonable suspicion," when seen
in the light of the constitutional policy espoused in Mapp, depends
on its being distinguishable from a search based on "probable cause."
The decision of the majority in the instant case has made that
distinction more apparent than real. Initially, as Judge Van Voorhis
pointed out, the frisk rests on uncertain ground. If we accept it
at all, we accept it as an exception to traditional "probable cause"
requirements in order that the police may protect their own lives.
But as an exception it must be strictly circumscribed. The confiscation provision of the "stop and frisk" statute, as interpreted
by the Court in Peters and Sibron, authorizes conduct clearly
beyond that which was approved in People v. Rivera. It is suggested that this interpretation is not likely to withstand the test of
constitutional reasonableness.45 In fact, to allow such confiscation,
and to admit such evidence is to circumvent the Mapp exclusionary
rule, thereby undermining the constitutional guarantees of the
fourth amendment.

A
CRIMINAL LAWUSE OF INCRIMINATING CONFESSION OF
CODEFENDANT IN JOINT TRIAL HELD GROUND FOR REVERSAL AS AN
ABUSE OF TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND VIOLATION OF NONCONFESSOR'S CONFRONTATION RIGHT. - At a joint trial, a signed,
post-arraignment confession of one defendant was admitted as corroborative evidence of a codefendant's testimony, despite non-confessing defendants' objections and motions for severance.
The
names of the non-confessing defendants had been deleted from the
confession, and the jury was emphatically instructed, before and
after its admission, that the confession was admissible only against
the confessor. In reversing the convictions of the non-confessing
defendants, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
44 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
45 See 50 CoRni.L L.Q. 529 (1964), for a discussion which also suggests
that the limitations on "stop and frisk" must be drawn at the Rivera holding.

